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Abstract  
This paper addresses the problems of corporate taxation in a globalized world. It first 
illustrates recent trends in international practices and then reviews the literature on the 
effects of corporate taxes in closed and open economies. The paper emphasizes the 
severity of the problems caused by current international tax rules. It compares various 
national and international policy proposals and considers two recent Nordic tax reform 
proposals as examples of national-level solutions. The problems of current international 
corporate taxation are fundamental. Introducing increasingly tight anti-avoidance 
measures could serve as a medium term approach but does not provide any promising 
long-term solution. There should be more research concerning initiatives that would 
reform the fundamental principles of the international tax system. 
Key words: corporation tax, international taxation, multinational firms, tax 
avoidance 
JEL classification numbers: H25, H32, H87, F23 
Tiivistelmä  
 
Raportissa tarkastellaan yhteisöveron vaikutuksia kansainvälisessä ympäristössä. Aluksi 
kuvataan yhteisöveron kansainvälistä kehitystä ja tämän jälkeen tehdään katsaus 
taloustieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen yhteisöveron vaikutuksista kansainvälisessä 
ympäristössä. Nykyiset kansainvälisen yritysverotuksen säännökset vääristävät monella 
tavalla yritysten ja maiden päätöksentekoa. Ongelmat ovat vakavia, koska ne perustuvat 
järjestelmän perusrakenteisiin. Raportissa arvioidaan erilaisia kansallisia ja verokoordi-
naatioon perustuvia toimenpiteitä. Esimerkkeinä kansallisista politiikkatoimenpiteistä 
tarkastellaan lisäksi Ruotsin ja Norjan verokomiteoiden esityksiä. Verosuunnittelua 
estävien säännösten tiukentaminen voi olla toimiva lähestymistapa lyhyellä aikavälillä, 
mutta koska ongelmat liittyvät kansainvälisen järjestelmän perusperiaatteisiin, se ei ole 
riittävä pitkällä aikavälillä. Kansainvälisen yhteisön tulisi panostaa verotusoikeuden 
jakoa koskevien sääntöjen kehittämiseen.       
Asiasanat: yhteisövero, kansainvälinen verotus, monikansallinen yritys, 
verosuunnittelu 
JEL-luokittelu: H25, H32, H87, F23  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate taxation has become a major issue in public debates in recent years. 
Often you cannot open a newspaper without finding a story about some country 
cutting its corporate tax rate or of a prominent multinational company (MNC) 
paying virtually no taxes on its world-wide profits. There is also a growing 
academic literature which examines the effects of corporate taxation on the 
decisions of firms and countries.   
Economists have long accused the conventional designs of corporate taxes of 
distorting the financing and investment decisions of incorporated firms, thus 
leading to losses in production and welfare. They have also suggested alternative 
designs free from such distortions. Another line of attack against corporate taxes 
questions the existence of a separate tax levied on corporations. After all, it is 
individuals who bear the burden of the taxes. Why not tax individuals directly? 
But despite this criticism corporate taxes live on and they continue to bring in an 
important share of countries’ tax revenue.  
Even if criticized for decades, the real challenge for corporate taxation arrived 
just after the deregulation of the capital markets and the increase in the 
importance of MNCs. In the new globalization era, business activity is more and 
more executed by MNCs with complex organizational structures and with 
owners commonly resident abroad. International trade has shifted from raw 
materials and manufactured goods to services. A larger share of this trade 
consists of intra-firm transactions. Similarly, capital flows are not primarily 
associated with direct investments spent on equipment and structures but more 
and more with financial capital and intangible assets.  
These changes have many important implications for conventional corporate 
taxes. Since so much of business is in the hands of MNCs, the question how the 
right to tax the profits of these firms is shared between the countries where the 
firms locate has grown in importance. However, due to the changes described 
above, it is much more difficult to define where profits are generated than it was 
when trade largely consisted of raw materials and manufactured goods.  
These changes also open up new possibilities for tax planning. According to both 
casual and research evidence MNCs have ample opportunities to shift profits to 
low-tax countries in various ways. There is also increasing evidence that 
inconsistencies in the tax rules of bilateral tax treaties facilitate tax planning 
strategies that may even lead to avoiding corporate taxes entirely. 
Individual countries and the international community have responded to these 
challenges in multiple ways. Countries have adopted anti-avoidance rules to 
combat tax planning. The Nordics are well advanced this respect. And there are 
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coordinated actions too. Examples of supranational initiatives include the 
OECD’s “Harmful Tax Competition” project started in late 1990s (OECD, 
1998), the EU’s informal “Code of Conduct in Business Taxation” and the 
OECD’s two-year campaign Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) started in 
2013 following an initiative by the G20 (OECD, 2013). How effective these 
measures are is still unclear, however. 
The aim of this article is to discuss the problems of conventional corporate taxes 
in a globalized environment where MNCs are responsible for an increasing share 
of production and trade. The aim is not to provide any comprehensive account of 
international tax rules or tax planning opportunities or economic evidence, but 
rather to provide a short discussion of the problems of the current international 
tax system and the potential remedies available to individual countries and the 
international community. In stressing the flaws of the entire architecture of 
international corporate taxation this article is indebted to several recent 
contributions such as Auerbach et al. (2010), Devereux (2012) and Ault (2013).  
The next section draws a picture of the trends in corporate taxation, paying 
attention to tax rates and revenues but also to the tax treatment of foreign-source 
income. After that we illustrate some key problems of corporate taxes in the 
international environment using a simple comparison of the effects in closed and 
open economy contexts. After that we survey recent evidence from empirical 
research concerning the responses of MNCs to tax differentials. The final 
discussion concerns potential domestic and internationally coordinated policy 
measures. 
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2. Recent trends in corporate taxation    
Table 1 presents the evolution of statutory corporate tax rates in the Nordic 
countries and in 10 other developed economies. We observe that the tax rates of 
the Nordic countries, currently between 20 and 27 per cent (2014), are 
internationally quite modest, clearly lower than in many large countries such as 
France, Italy, Japan and the USA, but quite close to the EU averages (EU27 and 
EU15). Of the western reference countries, the UK and Ireland have low 
corporate tax rates.  
In line with trends in other major countries, the statutory tax rates of the Nordic 
countries have fallen over the last two decades. Cuts in tax rates have been 
moderate, however, and have been more common in the last few years than 
around the millennium. Iceland is the main exception here. Many reference 
countries have implemented dramatic cuts during the period covered - Germany, 
Italy, Ireland and Poland in particular.  Germany’s tax rate has fallen by nearly 
30 percentage points. The Nordics differ here in that they reformed their 
corporate tax systems already a decade earlier, as illustrated in Figure 1. Their 
average nominal tax rate fell from 50 to 30 percent in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  
Table 1.  Corporate tax rates in selected countries, % 
 
1995 2005 2014 
Change btw. 
1995–2014 
Denmark 34,00 28,00 24,50 -9,50 
Finland 25,00 26,00 20,00 -5,00 
Iceland 33,00 18,00 20,00 -13,00 
Norway 28,00 28,00 27,00 -1,00 
Sweden 28,00 28,00 22,00 -6,00 
France 36,66 33,83 36,4 -0,26 
Germany 59,00 38,31 30,20 -28,80 
Ireland 38,00 12,50 12,50 -25,50 
Italy 53,20 37,25 31,40 -21,80 
Poland 40,00 19,00 19,00 -21,00 
Spain  35,00 35,00 30,00 -5,00 
United Kingdom 33,00 30,00 21,00 -12,00 
Canada 42,90 34,20 26,10 -16,80 
Japan 49,98 39,54 35,64 -14,34 
United States 39,61 39,28 39,13 -0,48 
EU27 37,00 24,45 21,70 -15,30 
EU15 37,73 29,95 25,77 -11,96 
Source: VATT 
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Even if harder to measure and illustrate, other aspects of corporate tax systems 
have changed as well. Many countries have broadened their tax bases by 
reducing depreciation allowances and special investment incentives, evidently in 
order to finance their tax rate cuts. Loretz (2008) provides evidence of this trend 
in a large group of developed countries. The trend seems to have continued into 
the 2000s, but has since slowed down considerably. This may reflect difficulties 
in broadening the tax base further after abolition of the principal tax expenditure 
rules. This pattern applies to the Nordic countries as well. They implemented 
reforms of this type in the early 1990s. More recently, many countries have 
strengthened their tax bases by introducing or tightening anti-avoidance measures 
such as the interest-limitation rules.   
While there have been sharp cuts in tax rates, we cannot detect any noticeable 
fall in corporate tax revenues, as shown by Figure 2. Revenue as a share of GDP 
fluctuates over time, reflecting the sensitivity of corporate profits to business 
cycles, but there is no clear decreasing trend. The drop in the level of tax revenue 
in 2008 without any marked recovery in 2009-2011 may turn out to be protracted 
or even permanent, but it is still too early to assess whether it is related to low tax 
rates or other factors.  
The puzzling combination of a downward trend in tax rates but no similar drop in 
tax revenues has been discussed much by tax economists, admittedly without any 
quantitative estimates of the importance of different  factors (see for example 
Devereux et al., 2002; Sørensen, 2007; Loretz, 2008; Auerbach et al., 2010). A 
natural explanation for the dilemma is that the base-broadening measures 
implemented by most (or even all) countries have counteracted the effect of tax 
rate cuts on revenues.  
Secondly the sustained level of revenues may reflect an increase in economic 
activity in a corporate form. There is indeed evidence of such a change, at least in 
Europe. In particular, part of this increase may be related to the fall in corporate 
tax rates.  According to this explanation, low corporate tax rates may have led to 
a switch in the form in which entrepreneurs withdraw funds from their existing 
firms. Similarly, new corporations have been established for economic activity 
which was earlier performed in the form of a sole proprietor or partnership. There 
is indeed evidence of such a phenomenon (see for example Fuest and 
Weichenrieder, 2002, and de Mooij and Nicodème, 2008).     
A third explanation might be that some smaller European countries which have 
drastically cut their tax rates may have been successful in attracting FDI and the 
profits of MNCs. If there are many small “winners” and only a few large “losers” 
in the tax competition game, our charts of unweighted average tax rates and 
trends in revenue shares should broadly be as they are in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
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In fact theoretical models of (asymmetric) tax competition predict such an 
outcome (see Bucovetsky, 1991; Keen and Konrad, 2013). 
Figure 1. Corporate tax rates 1981–2014  
 
Source: VATT.  
Figure 2. Corporate tax revenues as precentage of GDP, 1981–2013 
 
Source: Revenue Statistics 2014: Comparative tables. OECD Tax Statistics (database).  
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Finally, some have argued that the success of some sectors such as the financial 
and IT sectors has contributed much to the favorable development of tax 
revenues. Devereux et al. (2002) refers to the financial sector. Finland seems to 
fit this picture well. The rise of the IT cluster around Nokia contributed much to 
corporate tax revenue until recently.  
Next we will look at a trend in international tax rules for corporate profits. The 
current practice, guided by the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital and implemented in bilateral tax treaties, can be illustrated by 
distinguishing between two basic principles that delineate national tax bases. 
Under the source principle, a country is permitted to tax all income that arises 
within its borders, whether such income accrues to residents or to foreigners. In 
an environment with cross-border income flows, the principle can be 
implemented by letting the country of source tax the income and by exempting 
the income in the country of residence of the MNC.  
The other is the residence principle, which recognizes the right to tax all income 
accruing to domestic residents whether from domestic or foreign sources. Hence 
countries relying on the residence principle tax the worldwide income of 
domestic residents. This can be done by crediting foreign taxes against domestic 
tax on that income.  
There has been a long debate as to which of the two principles best serves  
individual countries or the international community. The residence principle has 
fared well in this debate, its merit being that it may lead to efficient allocation of 
capital across countries. The issue may be more complex than that (see for 
example Devereux, 2008), but the fact is that many large developed countries 
have traditionally taxed the world-wide income of their companies, providing 
relief against double taxation via the credit method. 
As Table 2 illustrates, the situation has changed: we can detect a clear trend from 
the credit method to the exemption method over the last two decades. Of the 15 
countries in Table 2, only Ireland and the USA still tax foreign income on a 
worldwide basis and there are three recent movers: Japan, Poland and the UK. In 
1991 a clear majority applied the credit system. Of the very few left there has 
been a keen debate concerning the need for a reform in the USA.1 
But why do countries hesitate to tax world-wide income? The answer seems to 
lie in how residence-based taxation affects domestic MNCs in global markets. 
Desai and Hines (2003) have shown that taxing the world-wide profits of 
domestic MNCs puts them in a disadvantaged position in global markets 
                                              
1 For the debate in media, see for example “Obama faces business backlash over cash pile tax”, Financial 
Times, February 3, 2015, and “Help American businesses - tax their profits abroad,” Financial Times , 
July 7, 2013, (a column by L. Summers). Grubert and Altschuler (2013) provide an evaluation of some 
proposals.   
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compared to companies residing in exemption countries. This point was 
emphasized in the UK in connection with its decision to switch to source 
taxation, and the argument has an important role in the current US debate as well 
(see e.g. IFS Green Budget, 2009, for the UK, and Toder and Viard, 2014, for the 
US).     
Table 2.  Treatment of foreign source dividends received by parent 
companies in selected countries 
 
 1991 2005 2012 Change 
Denmark Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Finland Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Iceland Credit Exemption Exemption c 
Norway Credit Exemption Exemption c 
Sweden Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
France Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Germany Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Ireland Credit Credit Credit - 
Italy Credit Exemption Exemption c 
Poland Credit Credit Exemption c 
Spain  Credit Exemption Exemption c 
United Kingdom Credit Credit Exemption c 
Canada Exemption Exemption Exemption - 
Japan Credit Credit Exemption c 
United States Credit Credit Credit - 
 
Sources: ZEW (2012) and OECD (1991). 
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3. The incentive effects of corporate taxation  
This section illustrates the effects corporate taxation may have on the decisions 
of firms and individual countries. We start from a closed economy context and 
then consider how the effects change if we move to an international framework. 
In order to focus on some key effects of corporate taxation, we will keep the 
approach very simple.  At the end of the section we discuss the evidence of the 
effects in recent empirical research. 
3.1 Closed economy  
Consider a firm that produces only domestically and receives all its financing 
from domestic households, but may participate in foreign trade by importing and 
exporting goods. Assume also that the home country runs an income tax system 
where tax is levied on personal income and corporate profits.  
There is a long-standing debate on the desirability of a separate tax levied on 
corporations. The debate has considered the double burden on corporate-source 
income that such a tax causes and the consequent distortions in the economy 
(Harberger 1962). It has also asked why corporations should pay a direct tax on 
income. Since individuals bear the burden of all taxes, would it not be logical to 
tax individuals directly on such income?  
That debate has raised at least two widely shared arguments for a separate tax. 
First, it may be reasonable to tax income at source on an accrual basis rather than 
to allow funds to be distributed to owners and try to catch them later (the 
withholding tax function). Taxing income later as the income of owners might 
cause higher administrative costs and lead to lower tax revenue. Similarly, any 
delay would mean that taxes levied successfully would have a lower present 
value. The second point has to do with the backstop role of corporate taxation in 
an income tax system. Without such a tax individuals would face incentives to 
earn their income through corporations and draw down the funds in the form of 
leniently taxed forms of income such as fringe benefits and capital gains (at a low 
effective tax rate).  
An obvious remark here is that if corporate tax systems were really designed 
based on these two principles one would expect to see integration between tax 
types such that the total tax rate on corporate-source income would be the same 
as on income from other sources. However, consistent integration attempts have 
been more the exception rather than the rule. But even if there were no original 
reasons for there being a separate corporate tax, these principles may be seen to 
be a justification for the existence of one.  
Economists have criticized the conventional designs of corporate taxes on many 
grounds. One is the asymmetric treatment of costs for debt and equity resulting 
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from the full deductibility of debt costs in business taxation but no similar 
deduction for equity costs. This distorts financing decisions and may lead to 
inefficiently high debt-to-equity ratios in corporations. 2 
But in a closed economy it is not crucial whether tax on corporate-source income 
is levied on the owner or the firm. It is the combined tax rate which matters for 
the incentive effects. If double tax relief using any method relieves the over-
taxation of equity income, it is not very important how high the corporate tax rate 
is. The situation is very different in an open economy, as we will see later. 
Nevertheless, the withholding and backstop functions of corporate tax speak for a 
fairly high tax rate in a closed economy, close to the highest marginal tax rates of 
individuals.      
Some countries tried to alleviate the distortions caused by excessively high 
taxation by providing full or partial relief for double taxation. One common 
method in Europe was to credit the corporate-level tax on distributed profit 
against the owner’s tax. This imputation system was applied by the four largest 
EU member states as well as Norway and Finland. A special feature of the 
Nordic applications was that they provided full credit for corporate tax and hence 
eliminated double taxation of distributed profits entirely.3 Norway even extended 
the relief to capital gains taxation. This approach has been called double 
asymmetry: while interest payments are deductible at the firm level but taxable in 
the hands of the financier, equity returns are taxed at the corporate level but 
exempt (or subject to a relieved tax) in the hands of the owner. This may lead to a 
neutral treatment of investment and the financing of firms at least in certain 
cases, but is not without its drawbacks. The fact that there are many differently 
taxed owner classes makes it difficult to find a satisfactory solution. Besides, 
most countries adopted just partial relief for double taxation of dividends.     
3.2 Open economy 
Let us next move to consider the effects of domestic corporate taxes on firm 
behavior in an environment where investors may invest in foreign financial assets 
and firms may operate across borders. For brevity, we focus on corporate 
taxation and leave the taxation of savings flows aside.   
How are MNC’s taxed? 
To understand the incentive effects of corporate taxation in an open economy it is 
useful first to look at some stylized aspects of international tax rules. As 
discussed in section 2, most countries today apply the source principle in the 
                                              
2 See de Mooij (2012) for a recent review. 
3 Also Germany provided full credit for corporate tax. Instead, the British and French systems  gave just a 
partial credit. 
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taxation of foreign-source dividends of domestic parent companies. This means 
that subsidiaries’ profits are taxed abroad in the host country and the repatriated 
dividends are tax-exempt at home. An important related aspect of current rules is 
that corporate groups are not taxed as a single unit. Rather their subsidiaries are 
independent tax subjects. This is called the separate accounting. When this 
principle is applied, no country or international organization keeps track on the 
total tax bill of the group.  
The alternative to the source principle, residence-based taxation, would go 
further since it, at least in its purest form, would tax the world-wide income of a 
corporate group and provide relief for double taxation using credit in the 
residence country.  
But when the taxation of the profit of a large corporate group is decentralized to 
the countries where the various units are located, the question arises of how the 
group-level profit is allocated to the countries where the group operates. The 
countries are certainly interested in the share of profit they are entitled to tax. 
How are their fair shares determined?  The answer is that there is a common 
allocation method that was adopted in international tax coordination 100 years 
ago. It is the arm’s-length principle, which requires the internal trade in goods 
and services between the different units of a corporate group to be based on 
prices that are comparable to the prices used between independent parties.      
Incentives faced by MNCs 
Consider now the choices of MNCs. Assume first that profits are allocated fairly 
between countries. There is no aggressive tax planning but firms take tax rules 
into account in their investment and financing decisions.  
International investors provide the MNC’s financing, requiring a fixed return r 
(gross of investor-level taxes).  Consider now an increase in the corporate tax rate 
in country A, where r is the same for all firms everywhere and other countries 
keep their taxes unchanged. The increase in country A’s tax rate on profits raises 
the before-tax rate of return required on investment in country A and therefore 
reduces investment there. As a result the capital intensity of production is likely 
to fall, which reduces the productivity and wage level in the country. In an open 
economy, an increase in the corporate tax rate is likely to hurt labor and other 
domestic (more) immobile production factors. Domestic and foreign investors 
still get the same internationally equalized gross return on their savings and do 
not necessarily bear any part of the burden of corporate tax. 
But the MNC’s capital stock mainly consists of real capital installed in 
machinery and buildings. It cannot freely flow to other countries with lower 
corporate taxes. This reflects the imperfect mobility of the existing capital stock. 
The outcome is rather that the high-tax country’s capital stock depreciates 
 11 
 
gradually due to wear and tear while most new investment by domestic 
corporations is made abroad.   
In this simple framework individual countries face incentives to lower the rates 
of their source-based corporate taxes. Gordon (1986) suggests that in a simplified 
special case where MNCs face no excess profits from locating in a country, the 
optimal source-based corporate tax rate is zero. Recent literature refers to this as 
a race to the bottom. The key intuition to understanding this result is that in this 
model corporate tax is effectively a tax on labor since labor bears the burden of 
the tax. Corporation tax, however, is a less efficient way to tax labor than direct 
taxes on wage income since corporate tax distorts the capital stock and reduces 
productivity.4  
The extreme result of a race to the bottom assumes that production in the country 
does not enjoy any special benefits from natural resources, skilled labor or good 
infrastructure. If we add in such aspects, the results are likely to be less extreme, 
but still the incentives to outsource production from a high-corporate tax country 
are present.  
We observe that the working of the tax system is very different in an open 
economy than in a closed economy. In a closed economy it is the total tax wedge 
on capital which is relevant for domestic investment. In an open economy, the 
level of corporation tax has a direct effect on domestic investment and this is 
likely to be larger than the corresponding effect in a closed economy. Domestic 
taxation of personal-level capital income does not have a direct effect on 
investment. Domestic savings now have a lesser role in financing investment. If 
there is a gap in financing resulting for example from weak domestic savings 
incentives, foreign investors may easily fill the gap, at least in the medium run. 
One implication for the tax policy of an individual country is that a high 
corporate tax rate combined with double tax relief for equity income at the 
personal level is no longer desirable. Rather, reforming corporate taxation 
combined with just some relief for dividends and capital gains at the personal 
level would be desirable policy. 5   
One consequence of a low tax rate on corporate income is that the withholding 
tax and backstop functions of corporate taxation discussed above no longer work 
or do so weakly. Therefore the incentive to cut corporate tax rate is likely to have 
spill-over effects on the whole income tax system in the form of tax revenue 
losses and administrative and compliance costs. These spill-over effects may 
justify a slightly higher corporate tax rate in order to avoid a very large gap 
                                              
4 Gordon’s (1986) result is, in fact, an application of the classic Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production 
efficiency theorem in an open economy framework. The classic result implies that taxes should not distort 
production decisions but should rather be levied on final consumers.     
5 For a Nordic debate on the desirability of owner-level double tax relief, see Apel and Södersten (1999), 
Sørensen  (2005), Lindhe and Södersten (2012).  
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between personal and corporate tax rates but also lower tax rates for personal-
level income.  
Relocation of profits and activities of MNCs   
We focused above on a firm that invests in order to gradually expand the scale of 
its capital stock. In that framework, it is the tax treatment of marginal investment, 
i.e. new investment that provides a return such that it is just worth implementing 
it, that determines the effects of taxation on investment. The relevant measure to 
illustrate the tax burden is the marginal effective tax rate, METR.  
But this view of firms’ operations is quite narrow. Companies establish new 
production plants, service centers, internal banks and other types of units, which 
may well earn high profits in today’s imperfectly competitive markets. In what 
way does taxation affect these high-yielding investments? The scale of these 
“lumpy” investments in entire production plants may well be sensitive to the 
METR. But the location choice probably is not. Recent economic analysis 
suggests that it is the average effective tax rate, AETR, that determines how tax 
rules affect location decisions. Choices of location might also be particularly 
sensitive to tax rules. Consider for example an American MNC trying to find a 
suitable site for its new subsidiary in Europe. If there are two alternative 
locations where the other aspects are equal but with a difference in the AETR, it 
would appear plausible that even a small difference in the tax rate could become 
pivotal.   
As explained previously, the allocation of the taxable profit of a MNC rests upon 
the arm’s-length principle, which requires that transactions between various units 
of an MNC should be priced in the same way as transactions between unrelated 
parties. If this is satisfied the allocation of taxable profits is similar as within an 
independent group of firms. However proper reference prices are often difficult 
to obtain, and therefore the system may leave corporations with considerable 
scope for over- or under-invoicing  internal transactions.  
Therefore the combination of source-based taxation and arm’s-length pricing, is 
sensitive to tax planning where profits accrued in a high-tax country are shifted 
to a low-tax country by manipulating the transfer prices of internal trade. The 
incentive to engage in this activity is greater the higher the nominal tax rate 
difference between the countries is. We may now summarize that tax rules affect 
various decisions by MNCs in different ways. The METR affects the scale of 
investment, the AETR the location of lumpy investment and the nominal 
marginal tax rate the incentive to shift profits.     
Profit-shifting may take many forms. One is manipulating transfer prices of 
internal trade in goods and services. Another is debt-shifting, which exploits the 
tax-deductibility of interest costs. To minimize taxes, debt issues within an MNC 
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should be located in high tax countries, and internal financial transactions should 
be designed so that a subsidiary located in a low-tax country (an internal bank) 
provides debt financing for units in high-tax countries.  A third variant makes use 
of relocating intangible assets such as patents and trademarks to a tax haven or to 
a country with a special low-tax regime for intellectual income (Patent Box). The 
MNC may gain a substantial tax saving since royalty payments are deductible 
business costs for those units that have used the services of the asset.      
3.3 Evidence of MNCs responses to incentives 
For some, the abundant anecdotal evidence of corporate responses to tax rate 
differences and tax planning opportunities reported in the media is enough to 
convince them that firms do respond to tax incentives and avoid taxes. There is 
also a lot of aggregate statistics showing strange facts about how financial and 
direct investment flows are channeled throughout the world. A few small 
countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Mauritius and Cyprus (with low 
tax rates or special tax regimes) are responsible for disproportionate shares of the 
total capital stock. While other institutional arrangements may also be relevant, 
taxation should necessarily have a role here. Furthermore, the sizes of the 
abnormal structures are felt to be indicative of strong effects (see e.g. Zuckman, 
2013, and IMF, 2014).  
In spite of such stylized evidence, it is important to have more direct and detailed 
empirical information on the responses of firms to some particular tax rules. 
There is in fact a large and increasing number of studies which consider many 
broader aspects, such as the effects of taxes on foreign direct investment, profit-
shifting, headquarter relocation, location of intangible assets such as patents etc. 
Even if the quality of this research line has probably improved due to better data 
and new micro-econometric methods, it may still be unclear how successful it is 
in analyzing the true causal link between international tax rules and MNC 
behavior. Therefore the results should be interpreted with care.  
The approaches and findings of this field have been summarized in several 
survey articles. The meta study by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) summarizes 
studies of profit-shifting. Their conclusions strongly support the idea that 
multinational companies do reallocate profits across countries to minimize their 
tax burden. They calculate that the “consensus” estimate of the size of the 
response, measured as a semi-elasticity, is –0.8. This tells us that, for example, a 
10 per centage point increase in the corporate tax rate decreases the tax base by 8 
per cent. The study also finds that debt-shifting, i.e. shifting profits using 
relocation of debt and interest deductions, is important but has a lesser role than 
non-financial forms of profit-shifting. For a recent review of this literature, see 
Dharmapala (2014).  
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De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) consider the 
investment responses. Both studies estimate a high semi-elasticity. The 
“consensus” estimate found in Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) is in the range of -
1.2 - -2.5. Hence a 10 percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate would 
decrease the business tax base of MNCs by an average of at least 12 percent.  
There are also several studies on corporate tax competition, i.e. on potential 
strategic responses between countries in setting tax rates. Devereux and Loretz 
(2013) survey this literature. The authors warn of the difficulties in 
distinguishing between different reasons for changes in tax rates and therefore in 
drawing strong conclusions supporting the hypothesis of tax competition. They 
suggest, however, that the literature seems to confirm that there is competition 
between countries in setting tax rates, particularly in Europe, where a large 
number of smaller countries are compressed into a small area. Small countries 
seem furthermore to be the most active players in this game.         
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4. What are the policy options?  
In this section we briefly discuss potential unilateral and coordinated measures to 
address the responses of MNCs to current tax rules and loopholes in them. We 
will start with the pros and cons of some more fundamental ways to reform 
corporate tax systems and then move on to evaluating some more gradual anti-
avoidance measures. Both sets of reform options are discussed from the point of 
view of a unilateral reform. In the last sections we discuss some coordinated 
policy alternatives.    
4.1 Options for fundamental tax reform 
We consider first whether a move to the residence principle would be a workable 
remedy to the problems of current corporate taxes. Then we assess two widely 
discussed proposals for reforming the domestic corporate tax base. The first is 
the ACE model (allowance for corporate equity), which was developed in the 
study by Boadway and Bruce (1984) and wrapped up later into an implementable 
tax system by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991). 
Under this model the normal return on a firm’s equity capital is exempted and tax 
is only levied on excess profit. The second is the CBIT model (Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax) first proposed by an American tax commission (US 
Department of the Treasury, 1992). It disallows the deduction for interest 
payments on debt and therefore broadens the tax base. We ask whether these 
measures would help and, if so, are there other reasons why they are not feasible? 
Residence-based tax 
As we discussed in Sections 2 and 3, the current international taxation of 
corporate profits relies on the source principle, which broadly means that profits 
are taxed in the place where they are generated. This practice provides MNCs 
with incentives to relocate investments and profits to low-tax countries. This in 
turn encourages national governments to lower tax rates and provide special tax 
regimes to attract MNC’s activities.  
The alternative approach, the residence principle, generally means that countries 
tax their residents on their worldwide income irrespective of where it is earned. 
Under this principle, the host countries of the MNC’s subsidiaries are still 
entitled to levy tax on profits earned within their borders, but the residence 
country gives full credit for these taxes against its corporate tax on the worldwide 
profit. If this were (really) implemented perfectly, foreign profits would be taxed 
at the same effective rates as domestic profits. Taxation would not provide any 
incentive to outsource investment even if the domestic tax rate were high. This 
principle would lead to efficient allocation of capital, and countries would not 
face incentives to cut their tax rates to attract investment. 
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However, this rosy view is more or less just theory. The residence principle in its 
purest form is difficult to implement. Most actual practices have limited the 
foreign tax credit to the amount of domestic tax due on the same income. 
Furthermore, credit has been provided only when foreign profits have been 
repatriated in the form of dividends. Therefore high domestic tax on foreign 
source dividends can be avoided by deferring the repatriation. Anecdotal 
evidence and empirical research from countries with residence-based taxation 
show that firms have indeed reacted to the “repatriation tax”. This has led to an 
accumulation of profits in the form of financial assets in low-tax countries. Desai 
et al. (2001, 2007) provide evidence of the effect on repatriations. Foley et al. 
(2007) show, that the high cash holdings of US-domiciled MNCs are partly 
explained by the incentives to collect profits in tax havens. Arena and Kutner 
(2015) investigate the responses of MNCs to the switch from residence- to 
source-based taxation, in Japan and the UK, and find increased repatriation and 
decreased holdings of cash in foreign units.   
Thus, actual applications of residence-based taxation are far from ideal, and 
therefore they produce many similar adverse incentive effects to source-based 
taxation. Countries also face weak incentives to choose the residence principle 
and therefore a wider switch towards it would necessarily need international 
coordination. As we pointed out in Section 2, one reason for such reluctance is 
that a combination of the residence-principle and a high domestic tax rate would 
put domestic firms at a disadvantage in global markets. Domestic MNCs will 
earn a lower return after taxes on their assets in foreign low-tax countries than do 
MNCs domiciled in countries which exempt foreign-source profits. This issue 
has been debated much in the USA, one of the few countries that still applies the 
credit method. For an early economic analysis of this issue, see Desai and Hines 
(2003), and for later discussions, Griffith et al. (2010), Toder and Viard (2014) 
and Grubert and Altschuler (2013).  
One consequence is that MNCs resident in a credit-country face incentives to 
relocate their headquarters to low-tax countries with the exemption method. 
Many such cases of so-called corporate inversion in the USA have recently been 
reported in the media (e.g. Athanasiou, 2014). Voget (2011) provides evidence of 
the effects of tax rules on relocation of headquarters. A higher repatriation tax 
rate is shown to increase the likelihood of switching fiscal domicile. This 
sensitivity is found to apply when the MNC resides in a credit country but is 
absent when foreign profits are tax-exempt.             
Reforming the tax base: ACE and CBIT 
A natural way to introduce these two tax models is to start from their shared 
background. Both models aim to address the aspect of conventional corporate 
taxes that debt financing is favored compared to equity. This non-neutrality is 
founded on the practice of allowing deduction for interest on debt but not for 
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equity. It is feared that this could lead to excessive leverage, distortions to risk 
taking and tax arbitrage.  The two reform options approach this issue, but in very 
different ways.   
Under the ACE model, the “normal” return (i.e. a return which corresponds to 
interest on government bonds) on a corporation’s equity-financed investment is 
exempted from corporate tax. As a result, the normal return on both equity and 
debt is exempt and tax is levied only on excess profit (rent). In contrast, CBIT 
disallows the tax deductibility of debt costs and therefore the full return on 
investment is taxed independent of the source of finance (debt or equity).  
Apart from being neutral with respect to financing decisions, ACE has other 
attractive properties as well. Since the tax burden of ACE only falls on rents, the 
model is neutral with respect to marginal investment decisions, which means that 
the distortion to the scale of investment vanishes. Furthermore, the distortions 
produced by inaccurately set depreciation rates for tax purposes and the 
sensitivity of investment to inflation disappear. This means that, in addition to 
the efficiency benefits, the tax system may be easier to design and administer 
under ACE. ACE is also seen being able to provide a basis for neutral tax 
treatment of risk taking. (See e.g. Mirrlees et al., 2011)       
By contrast, CBIT does not offer all these neutrality properties. It transforms the 
tax into a broad-based tax on all corporate source income. Both normal and 
excess return are taxed at the same rate. This means that, all other things being 
equal, a move to CBIT raises the tax burden on marginal investment, and, 
therefore, increases the distortion to the scale of investment. Nor are the 
problems with inflation, depreciations or risk-taking addressed. Yet, CBIT has 
the advantage that the tax base is broadened substantially. In a revenue-neutral 
reform it allows for a substantially lower corporate tax rate. This rate cut may 
mitigate the existing and introduced distortions even substantially.  
In an open economy where MNCs have a prominent role the relative benefits of 
CBIT can be still bigger. The low nominal tax rate would make the country an 
attractive place for investments and profits. At a more detailed level, the 
composition of inward investment is likely to change. Due to the full taxation of 
normal return, the country would not be particularly attractive for low-yielding 
debt financed investment. But, since rents are taxed at a low tax rate, the system 
is competitive for high yielding assets. On top of this comes the obvious benefit 
from the repeal of interest deduction. The system becomes immune to 
international debt shifting.                 
In contrast, the benefits of the ACE model do not compound when we move from 
a domestic to an international context. ACE allowance makes the corporate tax 
base narrower compared to a conventional corporate tax, which tends to reduce 
corporate tax revenues. In a balanced-budget tax reform this revenue loss must be 
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recovered in some way. One natural alternative is to raise the corporate tax rate.6  
In an open economy this would be problematic for several reasons. First, due to 
the high tax on rents, the country would become an unattractive location for 
highly profitable investment and firms. Second, the high tax rate on the narrow 
base would provide incentives for MNC’s to shift rents to low-tax countries. The 
probable outcome would be that MNCs resident in the country would enjoy the 
benefits of the ACE allowances but report most of their excess profits in low-tax 
countries.        
Both ACE and CBIT have recently been assessed by the Nordic governments. In 
June 2014, a commission submitted its final report, where it focused on 
reforming the Swedish corporate tax system with the aim of reducing the debt 
bias and curbing international debt shifting (SOU, 2014; Lodin, 2014). After 
considering a wide range of alternative measures, it ended up proposing a variant 
of CBIT. This application would disallow any deductibility of net costs of debt 
financing. Hence debt interest (and other related expenditure) would be 
deductible up to the amount of income earned on lending transactions but the 
excess amount is non-deductible.  
The ACE model was thrown aside. This was justified by the tax-base effect, 
which would have required compensating adjustments, most likely by increasing 
the corporate tax rate. The commission preferred a tax rate cut financed by 
broadening the tax base. It referred to calculations reported in a study of de 
Mooij and Devereux (2011), where the authors compare ACE and CBIT reforms 
using a general equilibrium model describing the European Union countries and 
the US and Japan. The study reports that, while the ACE model could be welfare-
improving when implemented jointly as an EU-wide reform, the CBIT model 
would work much better than ACE as a unilateral measure. This is especially so 
when the budget is balanced using the corporate tax rate. Interestingly, the 
country-level results showed that some western European countries with a large 
open sector would benefit greatly from introducing CBIT. The biggest welfare 
gains would be experienced by Sweden and the Netherlands, but Denmark and 
Finland were among the winners as well.   
The Norwegian tax commission, which submitted its report in December 2014, 
abandoned both CBIT and ACE and proposed a corporate tax cut from 27 to 20 
per cent combined with some base-broadening measures such as bringing 
depreciation rates for taxation purposes closer to the economic depreciation and 
tightening existing interest limitations (NOU, 2014). The commission justified 
the rejection of ACE by a preference for a broad tax base combined with a low 
                                              
6 Not all experts have seen the substantial revenue loss as a necessary consequence of an ACE reform. To 
minimize the initial loss Griffith et al. (2010) propose a gradual transition to the system by granting the 
allowance only to additional equity built up after the reform. They also argue that, since the incidence of 
the tax lies on the domestic owners of factors, it should not be necessary to compensate the potential 
revenue loss by raising the corporate tax rate.    
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rate. But the commission did not see CBIT as a workable solution either. A very 
low corporate tax rate facilitated by CBIT would make it more difficult to 
maintain the balance in the overall income tax system. A low corporate tax rate 
would cause lock-in effects and make it difficult to deter income-shifting 
between the personal and corporate tax bases.  
Aspects of the CBIT model have been discussed for a longer time, but there 
seems to be no analysis concerning the spill-over effects on other countries. For 
example, does a move by one country to adopt CBIT aggravate the reallocation 
of debt to countries which still have a conventional corporate tax? This seems 
probable and in that case the question arises how these other countries respond.  
They may cut their tax rates and put new anti-avoidance measures into operation.      
4.2 National anti-avoidance measures 
Let us consider next three types of unilateral anti-avoidance measures which are 
used by many countries, the Nordics included. We will discuss how effective 
these measures are and whether there is scope to emphasize them even more in 
future.  
CFC legislation 
We already discussed the pros and cons of residence-based taxation and saw that 
it probably is not an option that could be counted on as a unilateral measure. 
Implementing it efficiently has proved to be difficult and it may put domestic 
MNCs at a competitive disadvantage compared to firms resident in exemption 
countries.  
Despite this there might be potential partial steps towards residence basis which 
might be useful. One is CFC rules, currently in use in a large number of countries 
among them all Nordic states. These rules trigger an immediate inclusion of 
passive income earned in low-tax affiliates (for example interest income on 
internal loans by an MNC) in the tax base of the parent company of a domestic 
MNC. The ensuing double taxation of such income is relieved using foreign tax 
credit in the home country. The conditions for applying these rules usually 
include i) an ownership threshold (commonly 25 or 50 per cent), ii) a 
requirement that the income arises from non-productive activities such as passive 
asset holdings, and iii) a requirement that the subsidiary or affiliate faces a tax 
rate below some threshold level (for example one half or two thirds of the 
domestic tax rate). The Nordics are among those countries that have CFC rules 
(see Folkvord and Riis Jacobsen, 2014).   
How efficient are these national-level measures as tools? The OECD seems to 
trust on this measure since it has proposed tightening national CFC rules to 
counter the aggressive tax planning of large MNCs such as Google and Amazon 
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(OECD 2013). Indeed there is evidence that CFC rules do affect debt-to-equity 
ratios and passive income reported in tax haven countries. Altschuler and 
Hubbard (2003) studied a change in the US rules in 1986 and found evidence of 
reduced deferral of passive income abroad. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) 
studied the impact of a German reform and observed that CFC rules had an effect 
on the shifting of passive assets. But these benefits do not accrue without costs. 
Strict CFC rules are likely to raise the cost of capital of domestic MNCs abroad 
and place them in a worse situation than competitors resident in countries with 
lax or no CFC rules. Egger and Wamser (2011) provide evidence for this 
investment effect using German data. One implication of this outcome is that it 
might not be in the interest of governments to tighten their CFC rules 
unilaterally. 
The main problem with CFC rules, however, is that recent rulings of the 
European Court of Justices (ECJ) have impeded the efficient use of CFC 
legislation. In particular, in its judgment in the 2006 Cadbury-Schweppes case, 
the court ruled that the British CFC legislation implied a restriction against the 
freedom of establishment. As a consequence many EU countries have stopped 
applying the CFC rules within the EEA ( Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2013). Also the 
Nordic countries have adjusted their CFC rules to comply with the rulings of the 
ECJ (Folkvord and Riis Jacobsen, 2014).    
Interest limitation rules  
A second class of measures, which may be seen rather as a way to strengthen 
source-based taxation, has to do with setting restrictions on the deductibility of 
debt interest. There are broadly two main approaches. So-called thin 
capitalization rules define a threshold level for the acceptable size of the debt-to-
equity ratio for subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. If the firm’s actual “gearing” 
exceeds the threshold, any deductibility of internal debt costs is disallowed. The 
rules vary between countries but they are usually targeted at address cross-border 
internal debt within MNCs.  
Thin capitalization rules take no account of the size of interest payments even if 
these payments are the key means for transferring income, implying that these 
rules are not able to address the use of over-pricing of internal debt. The second 
approach is income-stripping rules. They restrict the net interest costs of a unit of 
a domestic or international corporate group to a share of gross earnings. Only 
deductions in excess of this ceiling are disallowed (wholly or partially). The rules 
are not only directed at MNCs but also apply to domestic corporate groups. 
Following the German reform in 2008, several European countries have adopted 
this type of rules, among them Finland and Norway. Denmark was the first 
country to adopt interest limitation among the Nordic states. Its current rules 
combine the asset-based and income-based approaches. Sweden also limits 
excess interest payments on internal loans. The rules differ from the two standard 
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types explained in this section (for a detailed comparison, see Folkvord and Riis 
Jacobsen, 2014). 
How efficient are these measures as tools? Again, there is evidence that both 
types of restrictions do affect the tax-sensitivity of the debt-to-equity ratios of 
MNCs in a significant way (Büttner et al., 2012; Wamser, 2013; Blouin et al., 
2013). The internal debt of a MNC is shown to decrease, compensated partly by 
an increase in external debt. However, both theory and evidence imply that the 
rules may have some unintended side effects. They seem to reduce domestic 
investment in high-tax countries (Büttner et al., 2014). Theoretical considerations 
also suggest that a unilateral tightening of CFC rules might not be attractive from 
the point of view of a single country. Haufler and Runkel (2012) construct a 
model where countries compete over mobile and immobile inputs through both 
tax rates and interest limitation rules. They predict that tax competition between 
identical countries leads to low tax rates and lax limitation rules. Furthermore, if 
countries differ in size, small countries tend to compete more aggressively. These 
results seem to suggest that the fight against international profit-shifting should 
not rely too much on unilateral implementation of anti-avoidance regulations.    
Transfer pricing rules 
A more discretionary approach to address international debt-shifting is to rely on 
the arm’s-length-pricing principle. The question is then to make sure that the 
prices applied by MNCs correspond to those between unrelated parties. Over the 
last few decades, governments have indeed increasingly responded to the threat 
of international profit-shifting by introducing provisions and developing 
assessment methods to monitor internal pricing of MNCs.7 But since intra-
company transactions tend to be firm-specific, identifying comparable 
transactions requires information that is difficult or even impossible to find.  
One response of countries to this difficulty has been the introduction of 
regulations which require companies to submit detailed documentation to the tax 
authorities where they justify their pricing practices. This responsibility to 
document pricing rules in advance makes the monitoring work of authorities 
easier, especially in cases where comparable prices are not available.  
One apparent problem of transfer-pricing rules is that implementing the rules in 
practice requires resources and imposes high administrative and compliance 
costs. Therefore the efficiency of the rules is a critical question. Luckily their 
effects have been the subject to some recent studies. Lohse and Riedel (2013) 
classify countries into three groups depending on the scope and strictness of their 
rules, and assess the relationship of this measure to profit-shifting. They find that 
                                              
7 For different methods for monitoring transfer pricing, see OECD (2010), and for a survey of country 
practices, see Lohse et al. (2012). 
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stricter rules significantly reduce profit-shifting. Beer and Loeprick (2014) and 
Büttner et al. (2014) provide additional evidence.          
4.3 Coordination based options  
The above quick review of the gradual national-level reform options suggests 
that they might be efficient, but for now they all have their limits. More extensive 
use of CFC legislation is impeded by the rulings of the ECJ and the arm’s length 
principle might be administratively burdensome to apply. Interest limitation rules 
appear more promising, but in the assessment of the Swedish tax commission 
(SOU, 2014) even they were seen as complex and therefore less desirable. 
However, the biggest drawback of these measures is that countries face weak 
incentives to implement them on a unilateral basis. From the more fundamental 
reform options, CBIT looks more promising, but is not tested in practice yet, and 
therefore implementing it requires substantial courage. Hence it seems plausible 
that without coordinated measures, distortions in investment locations, profit-
shifting and tax competition are likely to continue. But how much can the 
international community do and what are the options for reform?  
Let us start with the OECD’s recent project “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 
BEPS (OECD, 2013). This project aims at a reform of the existing international 
tax framework. Its action plan, containing 15 measures, was launched in July 
2013, and in September 2014 the OECD published a set of reports to address 
seven of the actions in the BEPS Action Plan. Some items in the plan aim at 
improving the coherence of corporate tax rules between different countries and 
preventing the abuse of the bilateral tax treaty network, so that there would be 
much less room for aggressive tax-planning strategies, which are now able to 
result in zero taxation. The project also attempts to design model tax rules to 
prevent base erosion through interest deductions, and suggests strengthening 
national CFC rules. New options to address the difficulties in the taxation of 
digital goods and services are also on the agenda.  
The OECD projects starting point is the current international tax system. If it is 
able to reduce inconsistencies in tax rules between different countries and if new 
anti-avoidance measures prove to be effective, the program may bring 
improvements to the current framework. Combined with unilateral action the 
effect may be larger. But as some observers have remarked, this is not 
necessarily enough (Ault, 2013; Devereux and Vella, 2014; IMF, 2014). The 
architecture of the international tax system remains as it is. Its cornerstones still 
are the source principle and arm’s-length pricing. The BEPS project would 
update it but not alter its basic structure. Tax rate differences between countries 
still affect the location of investment and taxable profits. Some have suggested 
that the incentives for high-tax countries to cut tax rates will even grow since 
these countries will have to compensate domestic MNCs for the higher taxation 
(Hines, 2014). The new legislation will also increase the complexity of the 
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current system. Tax competition may eat into anti-tax-avoidance rules too. 
Implementation of the proposed changes will be based on national decisions. 
There is unlikely to be any supranational legislation requiring national 
governments to comply with the agreements. The incentive for countries to 
follow the OECD’s suggestions may be weak and this may reduce the effects of 
the BEPS project.   
Recent debate has also raised some more far-reaching options. By way of a 
benchmark, consider first the evidently unrealistic option of harmonizing 
corporate tax rates. This model was raised by the Ruding Committee (1992) two 
decades ago in the form of a minimum rate, which has since been discussed in 
several studies (e.g. Brøchner et al., 2006; Keen and Konrad, 2013). This 
proposal could even solve the distortions discussed here altogether, but getting 
agreement on such a model would be very difficult under the current unanimity 
rule for tax policy decisions in the EU.8 
Consider next the idea of a unitary tax combined with a formulary allocation of 
taxable profits between countries. In this model, taxable profit is calculated for an 
entire corporate group and then allocated to the various locations (countries) 
using an agreed formula. This formula would replace the arm’s-length pricing of 
intra-firm transactions as a means of allocating profits between countries.  The 
European Commission’s proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) follows this idea. This approach would get round most of the 
problems associated with profit-shifting from high-tax to low-tax countries, 
certainly an attractive aspect in the current framework where profit-shifting is a 
major problem.9 Furthermore, the observation that the formulary approach is a 
standard element of state-level corporate taxes in many (or even most) 
federations, such as Germany, Canada and the US, also suggests that it has some 
merits in a framework of many small jurisdictions. But the model has many 
disadvantages too, one being that it still provides incentives to move real activity 
to low-tax countries. The proposal also favors debt financing and distorts the 
scale of investment. There is also the major difficulty of reaching a global, or 
even an EU-wide, agreement on the rules. Therefore the model may look 
attractive in theory but is less so in practice.  
A third coordination-based reform option would replace the current source and 
residence principles of international corporate tax rules with destination-based 
taxation (Bond and Devereux, 2002). This model would tax corporate profit 
                                              
8 For a summarizing discussion, see Griffith et al. (2010).     
9 While the unitary tax approach avoids certain forms of profit-shifting, the CCCTB generally is not 
necessarily free of such problems. There are, for example, significant border lines which may provide 
opportunities for tax optimization: between the national system and CCCTB and between member 
countries and third countries. Similarly, the definitions concerning a corporate group and physical 
presence in a country might become subject to tax planning. (Fuest, 2008; see also Raimondos-Møller et 
al., 2010 )   
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where the products are sold to a third party for consumption purposes. This tax 
would in effect be broadly similar to VAT, the main distinction being that the 
cost of labor would be deductible from the tax base. Hence the tax burden would 
fall on profits. The tax would have several advantages. First, since investment 
expenditure is deductible, the tax is neutral with respect to investment. Second, 
because the model disallows any deduction for the costs of debt, the tax is neutral 
with respect to financing and, therefore, does not provide incentives for debt bias 
or international debt-shifting. The destination principle also leads to the outcome 
that the location of real activity is unaffected by the tax. There is also much less 
scope for shifting profits and the tax does not produce any major incentives for 
countries to indulge in tax competition. Mirrlees et al. (2011) saw this model as a 
future solution that is not realistic in the short run but possibly later. The outline 
of a destination based corporate cash flow tax looks promising; future work 
should focus on its practical implementation and transition issues.10   
 
                                              
10 Devereux and de la Feria (2014) elaborate some aspects of an implementable system. 
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5. Concluding words 
Corporate tax has a potentially useful role in the tax system of a developed 
country. It helps in taxing corporate-source capital income at low administrative 
costs and it works as a backstop for individual income tax, thus curbing income-
shifting from the personal to the corporate income tax base.  
In the current international environment, conventional corporate tax systems 
seem to work badly. They provide firms with incentives to move the location of 
profits and real activity to low-tax countries and countries with incentives to cut 
their tax rates. Casual evidence reported in the media may suggest that the 
problem is extreme. However, research evidence suggests that while firms do 
respond to these incentives the magnitude of the responses is probably modest 
rather than huge.   
The problems of corporate taxation are nevertheless serious since their roots are 
in the fundamental architecture of the international tax system. More and more 
countries have adopted the source principle. Under this principle, profits are 
taxed where they are earned (or rather reported). The other crucial elements are 
separate accounting and arm’s-length-pricing. The source principle provides 
incentives to relocate activities to low-tax countries and the allocation 
mechanism provides firms with scope for shifting profits to low tax countries. 
There are many alternative ways in which the system could be improved. 
Countries could act on a unilateral basis and adopt anti-abuse measures such 
CFC rules and restrictions on interest deductions. The national-level options also 
include better functioning systems such as the ACE model and the CBIT model. 
As an example of actions by the international community, the OECD has 
proposed an action plan to update the current international tax system through 15 
specific measures. The European Commission has issued a proposal for a 
harmonized corporate tax base augmented with unitary taxation of corporate 
groups.  
There is evidence that anti-avoidance measures such as CFC legislation, interest 
limitation rules and tighter implementation of the arm’s length principle can be 
effective. Therefore more extensive use of these measures either in a unilateral or 
coordinated (BEPS) manner could reduce relocation. But there are clear 
weaknesses in this pragmatic approach. First, the measures have side effects, may 
cause double taxation and reduce investment. Second, national governments do 
not face clear incentives to implement these rules strictly. If the coordination-
based approach cannot produce any binding agreement, these measures will not 
become effective enough to stop profit-shifting. Third, a scenario where complex 
new legislation is introduced without sufficient impact on behavior is not 
promising. As a result, tax competition will continue even if more slowly, tax 
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revenues will decline and the administrative and compliance costs of the whole 
system will increase. We conclude that gradual improvements by tightening anti-
avoidance measures can hardly be a viable long-term solution.         
At first glance the CBIT model looks promising as a unilateral measure, and is 
clearly better than the ACE model, which seems to have drawbacks in an 
international framework. But CBIT may distort investment and undermine the 
backstop function of corporate taxation. Furthermore, there should be more 
research of the consequences of the reform, among them the spill-over effects on 
other countries.   
It would also be advisable to invest in research into the more fundamental 
approaches, the CCCTB model and destination based cash-flow tax. The former 
probably cannot form the basis of a perfect solution, but could be a functional 
compromise if the group of countries adopting it were sufficiently large. The 
latter, in turn, relies on sound principles and is therefore the most promising 
candidate for a long-term solution. In the meantime - which should not last too 
long - the more gradual approaches such as the interest limitation rules and 
removing inconsistencies between countries’ tax rules seem to provide a 
reasonable approach.      
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